September 21, 2023
AC 46142
Mother appealed the termination of her parental rights. The trial court had found, pursuant to statute (§ 17a-112 (j) (3) (B) (i)), that Mother had failed to achieve a sufficient degree of personal rehabilitation, considering the age and needs of the child, as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable time, she could assume a responsible position in her child’s life. She claimed on appeal, inter alia, that the trial court erroneously failed to rule on her oral motion for a directed verdict raised at the close of DCF’s case-in-chief, arguing that the trial court should have considered it a motion for a judgment of dismissal pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 15-8), rather than a motion for a directed verdict, pursuant to Practice Book § 16-37, which permits the judge to reserve decision on such a motion. She claimed that had the trial court properly considered the motion as a motion for a judgment of dismissal under P.B. § 15-8, it would have lacked the discretion to have reserved its ruling. The Court here held:
- The trial court did not err when it failed to rule on an oral motion for a directed verdict that counsel for Mother raised at the close of DCF’s case-in-chief. Under the unique circumstances of the present case, because the remarks made by trial counsel for Mother, both initially when the motion was made, and later when it was renewed, articulated the motion with sufficient clarity to place the trial court and opposing trial counsel on notice that Mother’s counsel was making a motion for a directed verdict, which led the trial court to evaluate the motion under Practice Book § 16-37, the invited error doctrine applied. Mother could not be heard to complain that the trial court improperly treated the motion as one based on § 16-37, rather than P.B. § 15-8. Moreover, when the trial court aptly questioned the applicability of a motion for a directed verdict in juvenile matters, but, nevertheless, entertained the motion, Mother’s counsel did not object to the trial court’s response to the motion. Furthermore, in concluding that the invited error doctrine applied, this Court was not required to address Mother’s related claim that the waiver rule should not apply to this case to bar appellate review of the court’s decision to reserve judgment on the motion.
- The trial court properly found by clear and convincing evidence, on the basis of its factual findings and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that Mother failed to achieve a sufficient degree of rehabilitation. The record demonstrated that the trial court considered all potentially relevant evidence in reaching its conclusion, including the testimony of two licensed psychologists and a family support specialist, as well as their written reports, which were admitted into evidence, that: Mother remained vulnerable to psychosocial stressors, her continued use of alcohol socially made her a high risk for relapse of other drugs, that returning the child would set her up to fail as a parent because she was incapable of managing her child’s needs, and that there were continued concerns with her compliance with her prescribed mental health treatment, particularly in taking psychotropic medicine, as well as continued concerns with her suicidal ideations and self-harming behaviors.
https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP221/221AP260.pdf
