In Re Kameron N.

In Re Kameron N. (AC 44079) – Part One/Father’s Appeal

TPR, Indian Child Welfare Act, Notice

Takeaway: Discussion of notice requirement in ICWA, and the involuntary nature of termination proceedings.

Father appealed the judgment terminating his parental rights with respect to his child, who had previously been adjudicated neglected. Father was a member of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe, and his child was eligible for enrollment in the tribe on that basis. DCF sent multiple letters to the tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) regarding the child’s involvement with DCF. These letters included, inter alia, one sent by registered mail, return receipt requested, informing the tribe that a TPR trial was scheduled, with the dates, times and location of the trial. A social worker representing the tribe signed for that letter. The tribe sent multiple letters to DCF indicating, inter alia, that the child qualified for enrollment, and it exercised its statutory (25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c)) right to intervene in the termination trial, but it did not appear.

On appeal, Father claimed that the tribe had not received proper notice, as required by federal law (25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a)), that the nature of the termination proceedings was involuntary.

The Appellate Court held that the trial court properly determined that the notice provided to the tribe complied with the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a).  The plain and unambiguous language of the statute requires that notice be given in any involuntary proceeding but does not require DCF to explicitly to state that a termination proceeding is involuntary.  The Court found that the fact that DCF had sent notice to the tribe, in and of itself, was indicative that the proceeding was involuntary, as tribes are not entitled by statute to intervene in voluntary proceedings; the letter that DCF sent to the tribe identified the proceeding as a termination of parental rights, which indicated the involuntary nature of the proceeding.

https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP202/202AP122.pdf

In Re Kameron N. (AC 44086) – Part Two/Mother’s Appeal

TPR, ICWA, Motion to Reopen Evidence, Clear Error 

Takeaway: Further discussion of notice requirement in ICWA, as well as motion to reopen evidence, when evidence seeking to be corrected/updated was not relied upon as part of the initial findings.  Additional discussion of the policy prioritizing a child’s need for stability over the parent-child bond.

Mother appealed the judgment terminating her parental rights with respect to her child, who had previously been adjudicated neglected. The child was eligible for enrollment in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe on the basis of his father’s tribal membership. DCF sent multiple letters to the tribe pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) regarding the child’s involvement with DCF. These letters included, inter alia, one sent by registered mail, return receipt requested, informing the tribe that a TPR trial was scheduled, with the dates, times and location of the trial. A social worker representing the tribe signed for that letter. The tribe sent multiple letters to DCF indicating, inter alia, that the child qualified for enrollment, and it exercised its statutory (25 U.S.C. § 1911 (c)) right to intervene in the termination trial, but it did not appear.

On appeal, Mother claimed that the tribe did not receive proper notice of the termination proceedings, as required by federal law (25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a)), and that the court erred in denying her motion to open the evidence and in finding that TPR was in the child’s best interest.

The Appellate Court held that Mother’s claims that the tribe received inadequate notice of the termination proceedings were unavailing.  Although DCF’s letters to the tribe did not strictly follow guidelines for implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) that Mother referenced in her challenge to the notice, those guidelines were not mandatory and did not expand the notice requirements set forth in the plain language of the Act.  Moreover, although the letter sent by registered mail informing the tribe of the details of the TPR trial did not advise the tribe of its right to intervene, the tribe previously had been advised of and acknowledged this right; thus, the notice complied with the requirements of 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (a).

Additionally, the Court here held that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion to open the evidence for the purpose of introducing new evidence regarding the child’s placement.  Contrary to Mother’s assertion, the court did not rely on the willingness of the child’s foster family to adopt him in determining that TPR was in the child’s best interest; thus, Mother’s purported new evidence was irrelevant to the issues before the court.

Lastly, the Appellate Court found that the trial court’s determination that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest was not clearly erroneous.  The court was entitled to determine, based on the evidence, that the benefit of the child’s bond with his mother, and the potential loss he would suffer from its removal, were outweighed by his need for stability and consistency, which she could not provide.

https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP202/202AP123.pdf