In re Kyllan V.

In re Kyllan V.
180 Conn. App. 132 (2018)

Collateral Estoppel
Termination of Parental Rights

The respondent father appealed from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights with respect to his minor child, K. The petitioner, K’s mother, sought to terminate the father’s parental rights on the grounds of parental commission or omission. K was present in the home when the father had assaulted one of his other children, M, although K was in another room with her half-sister, P, at the time. The court previously upheld the trial court’s decision to terminate the father’s parental rights as to P and M. The trial court in this case determined that K’s exposure to the incident with M was the same as P’s, concluded that the adjudicatory issues were therefore the same and had been fully and fairly litigated in P’s case, and applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in determining that the petitioner had proven the adjudicatory ground by clear and convincing evidence. The court then determined that terminating the father’s parental rights was in K’s best interest and rendered judgment terminating his parental rights, from which he appealed to this court. Held that the trial court improperly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in determining that the petitioner had proven the adjudicatory ground by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, a new trial was warranted: although a child’s status as a bystander to an act of abuse of a sibling can be sufficient for the termination of parental rights as an act of commission or omission under § 45a-717 (g) (2) (B), the only basis for the trial court’s finding in the present case that K had been denied the care, guidance or control necessary for K’s physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being as a result of the abuse of M was through collateral estoppel, but because the issue of whether the father’s abuse of M resulted in a denial to K of care, guidance or control necessary for her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being was neither actually litigated nor necessarily determined in the prior proceeding, and because the circumstances of the termination of the father’s parental rights as to M and P were separate and distinct from those as to K, collateral estoppel could not apply to preclude the father from litigating whether his abuse of M resulted in the denial of care, guidance or control necessary for K’s physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being; moreover, the petitioner’s attempt to marshal the facts found by the trial court in support of her argument that the adjudicatory ground was proven without resort to collateral estoppel was unavailing, as the trial court did not state a basis for its finding that the denial of care, guidance or control was established by clear and convincing evidence other than through collateral estoppel, and it was not for this court to find facts.