February 1, 2025

Termination of parental rights; ineffective assistance of counsel; applicability to child protection matters of presumption of prejudice standard discussed in U.S. v. Cronic (466 U.S. 648); available remedies to vindicate right to effective assistance of counsel in termination of parental rights proceedings as discussed in In re Jonathan M. (255 Conn. 208).

  • Father charged & found guilty of murder in 2013, sentenced to 50yrs of incarceration.
    • Not able to care for child, who remained in mother’s care (who suffered from mental health and substance abuse issues and had child protection history dating back 2 years for neglect).
    • Child is a special ed student: emotional disturbance, specialized mental health needs and has been to nearly 10 foster care placements, qualifies for therapeutic foster home.
    • 2020 child found neglected under Mother’s care, committed to DCF.
      • DCF offered father reunification services, looks like he didn’t do much.
  • 2022 DCF filed petition to terminate father’s parental rights on grounds: (1) Child abandoned bc failed to maintain reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for child’s welfare, (2) child previously adjudicated neglected and father failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation, (3) father had no ongoing relationship w child.
  • 2023 Termination trial, father didn’t present any witnesses or exhibits.
    • DCF withdrew 2 of their alleged grounds for termination, proceeded solely on grounds that child was neglected, abused, uncared for and father failed to achieve sufficient rehabilitation to assume responsible position in child’s life.
      • Father’s counsel admitted to failure to rehabilitate but argued it was bc he couldn’t as he’s incarcerated → this is where father’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel stems from.
    • Termination of parental rights was in child’s best interest → appointed DCF as statutory parent.
  • Respondent father appealed from judgment terminating parental rights → claimed denial of effective assistance of counsel in violation of due process rights under 14th amend. & Art. 1 §10 of CT Constitution.
  • 1. First claim: Counsel’s allegedly deficient performance was of such magnitude that it created structural

error under Cronic.

  • Standard of range of counsel’s competency: counsel whose performance is reasonably competent, or within range of competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in that particular area of the law.
    • Father must prove counsel’s performance fell below this standard
  • Presumption of prejudice standard set by Cronic doesn’t extend to child protection matters.
    • So respondent father inadequately briefed issue of prejudice & couldn’t prevail on claim.
    • In re Amias I.: significant differences between child dependency proceedings & other judicial proceedings militate decisively against applying a per se reversible error rule in dependency cases.
    • In re Jaelynn K.-M., (229 Conn. App. 383): Cronic’s presumption of prejudice wasn’t applicable to constructive deprivation of counsel claim in child dependency proceeding.
    • Respondent only argued prejudice should be presumed, but didn’t address issue of prejudice in his briefs to the court or prove his counsel’s alleged incompetency contributed to loss of his rights.
  • 2. Second claim: He has a due process right to a hybrid habeas fact-finding proceeding in trial ct to further

develop record as to ineffective assistance of counsel claim bc procedures available to him are inadequate to vindicate his right to effective counsel.

  • Rejected claim that father had constitutional right to a hybrid habeas fact-finding proceeding in trial court to more fully develop record to support his claim of denial of effective assistance of counsel
  • Father cited In re Jonathan M. (255 Conn. 208): other means of vindicating right to effective assistance of counsel where indigent parent can challenge a termination judgment
    • Father didn’t attempt to use the other two options, such as final judgment of termination or direct appeal from the termination judgment.
  • 3. Third claim: If he doesn’t have due process right to hybrid habeas fact-finding proceeding, this court

should exercise its supervisory authority to create one. → denied by court.

  • Ct declined to exercise supervisory authority over admin of justice to afford father a right to such fact-finding proceeding.

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