IN RE JADIEL B (2024)

AC 47325

In re Jadiel B., the respondent father, Joel B.-R., appealed the trial court's judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor child, Jadiel. The Commissioner of Children and Families initiated the termination proceedings, alleging, among other things, that the department had made reasonable efforts at reunification with Jadiel, that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, and that reasonable efforts were not required due to a previously approved plan other than reunification. The trial court agreed, finding by clear and convincing evidence that the department had made reasonable efforts to reunify the respondent and Jadiel and that the respondent was unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts.

On appeal, the father challenged these findings, particularly arguing that the Department of Children and Families (DCF) failed to provide rehabilitative services while he was incarcerated prior to the filing of the termination petition. He also argued that the trial court improperly considered DCF's efforts after the termination petition when determining reasonable efforts.

The Appellate Court began its analysis by outlining the legal framework governing termination of parental rights in Connecticut, specifically referencing § 17a-112 of the General Statutes. They noted that a termination hearing has two phases: an adjudicatory phase, where the court determines if statutory grounds for termination exist (by clear and convincing evidence), and a dispositional phase, where the court decides if termination is in the child's best interest (again, by clear and convincing evidence). The Appellate Court emphasized that DCF must prove one or more statutory grounds for termination and, unless an exception applies, must also prove it made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent.

The Appellate Court focused on the trial court's finding that the respondent was "unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services." Citing § 17a-112 (j) (1), the court explained that DCF can meet its burden regarding reunification in one of three ways: (1) by proving it made reasonable reunification efforts, (2) by proving the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from such efforts, or (3) by a prior judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate. The court emphasized that the trial court need only find that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, in order to uphold DCF's petition for termination.

Here, the trial court found, based on clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent was unable and unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. Because of this finding, the Appellate Court determined that it did not need to address the father's argument that DCF failed to make reasonable reunification efforts. The court's decision to focus on the parent's unwillingness to benefit from services demonstrates a pragmatic approach, emphasizing that the focus should be on the parent's capacity and desire for rehabilitation, rather than solely on the department's actions. The court made note of the fact that, the respondent had a "long history of substance abuse and mental health issues and criminal activity," and failed to obtain consistent employment or housing, only sporadically attended substance abuse and mental health treatment programs, and continued to test positive for drugs and alcohol.

The Appellate Court did not substantively address the father's claim that DCF's failure to provide services during incarceration violated his equal protection rights. The Court, in a footnote, made clear that it followed the jurisprudential policy of judicial self-restraint, and that it was not necessary to consider a constitutional question, as the court had affirmed on other grounds.

Ultimately, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating the respondent’s parental rights.